Histrionic

–adjective Also, his·tri·on·i·cal.

1.	of or pertaining to actors or acting.

2.	deliberately affected or self-consciously emotional; overly dramatic, in behavior or speech.

–noun

3.

an actor.

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Today's post is about whether or not mosquitoes (representing them as an example for lower-cognitive beings) deserve the same rights as higher-cognitive beings. At first sight it might seem a silly argument, but if the line has to be drawn somewhere, I'd like to know where it is (and if I can justify swatting the critters away).

In other posts I have made arguments for nonhuman biological entities, so I will expound upon those. The main question I ponder is the difference between those entities that are closer to us in the biological spectrum (and in sentience) and something of a relatively small size and sentience. Firstly, I hesitate to judge all things on the power of their intellects. Strong intellectual ability may be our mainstay, but an extra case must be made in order for it to be the scale that decides the rest of biological merit--it reminds me of homo-centrism, and as that has already proven to be an enormous hurdle in trying to objectively define the rights of nonhuman entities, it deserves special attention.

However, that which is morally able is more respectable, in a way, because it too can choose to respect other creatures even when it need not. However, does this allot it more rights? If anything, it allots it (morally) less, so in terms of who deserves the most of our attention, this does not seem an appropriate referent. So is there a line at all?

The situation I imagine is one where a monkey is sitting on a stump on one side of a fence, and a human on a stump on the other side. A mosquito flies over and lands on the shoulder of both, seeking blood. Irritated by the mosquito, both slap their shoulders, effectively ending their limited lifespans.

Is the loss too minor to count in the moral spectrum? Because certainly the human has more of an obligation to ruminate on that which he or she is swatting to death before doing so, when the monkey would not be (usually) naturally (or ably) inclined to do so. As the biological materials that make up all living entities on this planet share much of the same materials, and it is relatively arbitrary to draw lines because of that, we are forced to do so by characteristics--in most cases, the flaring of electricity in the brain, however powerful that brain is, is a fair indication of life. While extremely tiny, mosquitoes have brains.

Because we are larger than insects, and their lifespans and styles are obviously far more temporal than ours, ought we to ignore the moral implications of destroying them, if there would be any at all, as a result of our unified moral theory on how to treat nonhuman (and/or human) entities? Slippery slope or not, what would it be about the life of a mosquito that delegates it the position of unworthy of moral concern?

So far, in my understanding, I have found no reason to ignore the moral implications set by understanding that all living things share a right to life, and that we, as intelligent beings, have extra responsibilities in caring for and not harming that life. As far as I can tell, the lines would be arbitrary--certainly there are far less guilty consciences in the world due to insect destruction than higher sentience animal destruction, but we cannot draw moral lines on how the living thing relates to our own existence, by size, power of sentience or otherwise. More powerful intellectual ability is a poor excuse.

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Now, another related argument could be that for plants. The divide between plants and other forms of life are obviously a much larger divide than between humans and nonhuman animals, but they remain lifeforms that, regardless of sentience, can be positively or negatively affected by our actions. However, perhaps, the moral implications are much less severe (if even existing at all) if only for the lack of brains. However, I am not ready to count them out entirely in the moral game. They are still alive and propagating (if, in most cases, much less intrusively than other mobile species), and may deserve the same respect. Again, however, I am absolutely certain that at every step of this argument I have missed several important facts of note, and that each point is subject to and likely to change.

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Now, expounding upon the "removal" theory from a previous post, another distinction I should make is that I'm not arguing for making ourselves entirely invisible. Obviously, wherever we go, we'll have an effect, whether it's on a planet or an asteroid or anything else. What I argue against is negative influence (on life at the rest least), and as far as I know, it's seemingly impossible for us, having already ascertained the ability needed to win the planet, to continue living on it and not affect the rest of biology negatively. Going elsewhere, where we might not be impeding the right to life and to evolve of biological entities (because there are none, save ourselves), might be more moral. Now, another thought sprang to mind, perhaps just due to my word choice, in that we limit even ourselves, via natural interaction, from some evolving and having certain rights, but that would be another yet similarly crucial argument, I think.

I just wanted to make that distinction because my argument sounded rather misanthropic: as if wherever we go, we have an obligation not to exist--we most certainly have the right to exist, it would just be far more moral if it were in cultivating an otherwise empty planet than continuing to impede our common biological life on this one.

But still, I am restless and wary of this theory. It sounds extraordinary and I do not have extraordinary evidence. I look forward to the information I have missed or neglected, especially regarding lower-sentience lifeforms and plants.