Verbiage

\VUR-bee-ij\, noun:
1. An overabundance of words; wordiness.
2. Manner or style of expression; diction.

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Our lengthy discussion in class was an astute one, I think—examining Aristotle’s literature and language, it was noted by several students that the subjective connotations of the word “happy” fell in direct contradiction to claims that one could be deluded, and therefore not be experiencing true happiness. It was quickly understood that, should this be true, it would be extremely difficult to know whether or not one was happy, sad, angry, etc.

The problem, perhaps, is the word happy. In the example mentioned, a woman could live her entire life believing herself to be happy, but experiencing a delusion (Matrix?). Would it be fair, then, to say that she was not actually happy, and that after learning of her delusion, would believe herself never to have been happy?

The example Johnson gave in class is one I’ve heard before, and wrote down as an example—if one is experiencing a toothache, then there is no person better qualified to make that assessment. One can speak of the toothache’s origin, one can even say that the toothache is entirely a mental delusion, but this does not change the subjective impression of a toothache.

I think happiness is the same way. The women, being unable to recognize her delusion, experiences the mental, psychological and emotional effects of happiness. Though her directives are skewed and her life a sham, she still experiences happiness. This is the point that everyone is class was quick to jump on, and sensibly so.

The problem is the word—we most commonly associate it with the mood, rather than the lesser used (but in my opinion, still valid) definition as a state of satisfaction or fulfillment. Surely neither the woman nor we would deny that in fact she was bereft of a consciously fulfilled life, and upon learning of her delusion is forced to change her understanding, and now see her life as a sham. Her happiness, however, is a subjective reaction to her belief in a fulfilled life, and is not necessarily changed by revelation.

Marx seemed to advocate this view when he spoke of (at least some) housewives not having conscious happiness—instead of denying their subjective impression of happiness, he is denying their fulfillment as people, and the validity of their satisfaction. None of us would deny, then, that if happiness is defined as a mood, it cannot be contradicted by an outside authority, but neither should we agree that one’s satisfaction cannot be an objective truth.

There are subjective truths in the world, and something like a mood or a toothache are good examples of this. We need be wary, however, of stretching that medium too far—as it seems to me that there are far more objective truths that will have great bearing on human nature (such as one’s fulfillment and personal, conscious, autonomous satisfaction) that exist, and that these, on the whole, will set the stage for true insight into the matters at hand.