1. The use of trickery or sophistry to deceive (as in matters of law).
2. A trick; a subterfuge.
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Part II
This has often been called the “morally relevant difference” in debates concerning animal ethics. I have scoured material on the subject since early this school year, and since first considering that humans, too, are animals, I have not found one morally relevant difference between humans and animals that makes it morally acceptable to kill one for food and not the other.
Some have argued that morality is the difference—animals cannot treat us with the same respect for our lives, and are thus unqualified to receive moral consideration. I find it rather the opposite—in all cases of moral patienthood, where one creature is capable of morality, and the other unable to self-reflect (and thus be consciously aware of the suffering they may or may not cause), it is in the responsibility of the self-reflective being (the moral agent) to, instead of ignoring considerations of suffering incurred via their actions, take it within context and act accordingly.
Under this proviso, considering that sentient animals are very much capable of suffering, that between sentient animals and humans there are no morally relevant differences that allow suffering to be consciously caused one but not the other, and that as similar members of the biosphere of sentient creatures (as we, too, are animals), I find a responsibility not to eat animals, whether personally killed or not.
But, of course, this is where the “but” comes in, as I do not very much expect everyone will have the same opinion as me on this issue. However, if asked, I do think the average American should be a vegetarian—it gets very scary when people force you to elaborate on the details of what you believe, but I am not so bashful as to claim I think I alone am the only moral agent reasonably compelled (or should be reasonably compelled) to vegetarianism.
Nonetheless, it is in my greatest disinterest to lay stake in the morality of others, which is why, particularly in this scenario, what is most crucial is continued dialogue about the issue—as with all moral quandaries, it will always be the individual who must conclude what moral action is; all else is an appeal to force from an unqualified authority, and an inefficacious one at that.
4 comments:
There's no need to be bashful at all (aside from politics and the pragmatics of getting something done): what's right for any one moral agent will be right for any other, similarly situated moral agent. (And the similarity in question is only morally relevant similarity.)
Indeed, but far too often do I see indubitably informed moral agents demanding action on the account of their peers and rather than acting as thoughtful persons instead condemning others in a dogmatic fashion. It is this persona that I would recede from in my bashfulness--but still, not so untenable that I would be incapable to discuss the scenario with anyone able or willing to understand I am a moral agent rather than a moral policeman.
I'm afraid too often issues like this bleed into spheres that are not as thoughtful as they should be--and thus must the slightest of cautions be ensured to save one's audience from turning off at the slightest mention of moral obligation.
Right; you list some specifically political or pragmatic considerations.
While I don't think ethics (unlike taste) owes much to individual preference or opinion, it is clear that people strongly favor discovering for themselves, perhaps triggered by the thoughts or words of others, what is right/wrong.
Indeed, I agree entirely.
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